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CORPORATE FREE MARKET
RESPONSIBILITY: ADDRESSING RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS WITH A FIDUCIARY DUTY
APPROACH TO NATURAL RESOURCE
EXTRACTIONS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE
ZONES
The deep irony is that it is the unfettered rise of corporate power
that presents the biggest threat to free markets, and to the ability of
free markets to promote individual freedom, equality before the law
and equitable prosperity. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
While the free market has been characterized by some as a conduit for
individual freedom, 2 absent institutional prerequisites such as property
protections and voluntary contracting, it risks transforming into just the
opposite. 3 Nowhere is this dysfunctional transformation more apparent, yet
largely unaccounted for, than in the context of corporate natural resource
extractions in weak governance zones, 4 where many of these institutional
prerequisites are lacking. In pursuing shareholder profit maximization,
corporate conduct is premised on the same free market principles, the
absence of which can impede the legitimacy of its contracts. 5 From
Colombia to Burma, corporate contracts that are voluntary with respect to
the contracting government are made at the expense of local communities
whose property interests are either undermined or never accounted for.
Often, for example, property is physically confiscated, communities are
displaced without compensation, environmental effects of new industry
create new hazards for local communities, project revenues are
1. Stephanie Blankenburg & Dan Plesch, Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Restoring
Legal Accountability (2007), available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalizationinstitutions_government/corporate_responsibilities_4605.jsp.
2. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 8 (1962).
3. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights
and transitional corporations and other business enterprises, Business and Human Rights:
Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, 3,
A/HRC/4/035 (9 Feb. 2007) [hereinafter SRSG Report] (“Markets function efficiently and
sustainably only when certain institutional parameters are in place. The preconditions for success
generally are assumed to include the protection of property rights, the enforceability of contracts,
competition, and the smooth flow of information.”).
4. Weak governance zones can be “defined as those states, as well as regions or sub-regions
within states, in which governments cannot or will not assume their roles in protecting rights—
including human rights—providing basic public services and ensuring that public sector
management is efficient and effective.” INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF EMPLOYERS,
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES 3
(2006).
5. See discussion infra Part IV.
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misappropriated, or local stakeholders are excluded from local
development. 6 The end result is often local protest followed by state
repression accompanied by human rights abuses. 7
Legal remedies such as the Alien Tort Claims Act 8 (ATCA) have
generally been applied to address human rights abuses under an emerging
doctrine of corporate social responsibility. 9 The validity of contracts from
the perspective of the corporation’s free market responsibilities, however,
has frequently escaped scrutiny. This oversight results from a failure to
account for the first half of a dual-tier pattern of abuses. 10 Extractive
operations initially result in first-tier property violations, which entail
displacement of local populations, interference with their use of property, 11

6. Tarek F. Maassarani, Margo Tatgenhorst Drakos & Joanna Pajkowska, Extracting
Corporate Responsibility: Towards a Human Rights Impact Assessment, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J.
135, 138–40 (2007).
7. For example, see Andrew Bosson, Forced Migration/Internal Displacement in Burma 53
(May
2007),
available
at
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/
(httpDocuments)/D057F0FCA432F4B5C12572D7002B147B/$file/Burma_report_mai07.pdf
(noting that the energy sector, which is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in Burma,
is associated with forced labor, forced relocations, and widespread land confiscations); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES (1999) [hereinafter HRW NIGERIA
REPORT], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/Nigew991-01.htm#P190_8265;
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COLOMBIA – A LABORATORY OF WAR: REPRESSION AND VIOLENCE
IN
ARAUCA
(2004)
[hereinafter
AI
COLOMBIA
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/report/info/AMR23/004/2004; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NIGERIA
TEN YEARS ON: INJUSTICE AND VIOLENCE HAUNT THE OIL DELTA (2006) [hereinafter AI NIGERIA
REPORT], available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/report/info/AFR44/022/2005; Robert Dufresne,
The Opacity of Oil: Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 331, 336 (2004).
8. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
9. While a strict definition of corporate social responsibility is elusive, Thomas McInerny
characterizes it as:
an umbrella term that refers to a variety of initiatives ranging from voluntary codes of
conduct to programs whereby companies can undergo external audits to verify the
adequacy of their practices in a variety of areas of social concern. Although generally
lacking formal state power of sanction, these efforts look to international law for their
normative authority, intending to apply sometimes-latent international legal
prescriptions directly to corporations.
Thomas McInerny, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 172 (2007). John Ruggie notes that:
corporate responsibility is being shaped through the interplay of two developments: one
is the expansion and refinement of individual responsibility by the international ad hoc
criminal tribunals and the ICC Statute; the other is the extension of responsibility for
international crimes to corporations under domestic law. The complex interaction
between the two is creating an expanding web of potential corporate liability for
international crimes—imposed through national courts.
SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 8.
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. Id.
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or exclusion from profits earned from their displacement. 12 Corporate
recruitment of abusive state forces to protect their operations from resulting
unrest consequently generates second-tier human rights violations of
protesting communities, including widespread detentions, extrajudicial
killings, and forced disappearances. 13
In highlighting free market questions implicated by first-tier property
violations, it is argued here that in order to preserve the legitimacy of a
corporate contract for natural resource extractions, a corporation must adapt
its fiduciary duty to address, rather than exploit, distortions created by the
accountability gaps present in weak governance zones. Two such
distortions are (1) the politicization of corporate activity and (2) the creation
of a new breed of investor: affected landowners as involuntary investors. 14
In this context, it is not enough that directors be given greater discretion to
exercise business judgment 15 in accounting for broader stakeholder
interests. 16 An expanded fiduciary duty should encompass a broader duty of
due diligence to local communities. The fact that property interests of local
community members are frequently invested in the corporate endeavor
against their will is more, not less, reason to ensure that their interests are
accounted for by a governance structure that prioritizes voluntary
contracting. 17 In furtherance of this duty, corporations should be required to
put in place a preventative compliance system, which includes impact
assessments, community consultations, and reporting requirements. 18
Absent representative local governance in countries where the extractions
are taking place, each of these measures serves to address the accountability
gap, ensure property protections, and preserve corporate free market
legitimacy.
Much of the existing scholarship proposes similar compliance schemes,
but looks at corporate accountability from the perspective of its consistency
with human rights principles. 19 This note aims to highlight ways in which
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.
The “business judgment rule” is a presumption that the directors are acting in the
corporation’s best interest. Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 609 (Del. Ch. 1974).
This results in “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985).
16. See discussion infra Part V.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See ANITA RAMASASTRY & ROBERT C. THOMPSON, COMMERCE, CRIME AND CONFLICT:
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 (2006); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an
Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. 75 (2005).
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contemporary corporate governance in the United States has failed to
appropriately account for its role in weak governance zones in a manner
consistent with its own free market principles. In examining local responses
to natural resource extraction in countries such as Colombia, Burma, and
Nigeria, Part II of this note identifies the dual-tier rights violations that
occur when corporate contracts with unrepresentative governments displace
local communities and subject protesting populations to abuse. Part III
highlights the limitations of existing legal remedies, which have been
tailored to address second-tier human rights violations with little
opportunity for addressing the root causes of these violations. Part IV
explores the free market underpinnings of the shareholder primacy model
and its role in generating distortions in weak governance zones.
Recognizing these distortions, Part V argues for an expanded conception of
corporate fiduciary duties to address first-tier violations. Finally, Part VI
concludes the note by briefly evaluating the challenges and prospects for
such an approach.
II. UNACCOUNTABLE EXTRACTIONS AND THE DUAL-TIER
STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS
Corporate contracts for natural resource extractions in weak governance
zones, which will be referred to here as unaccountable extractions,20
frequently result in a hierarchy of abuses. An unaccountable extraction that
results in dual-tier public and private rights violations generally is
embodied by three elements: (1) an agreement between a corporation and
an unrepresentative regime 21 that (2) licenses the corporation to extract
natural resources 22 (3) either from property on which local communities
live 23 or in a way that substantially affects the surrounding population’s use
of the land. 24 Such extractions typically result in second-tier human rights
violations, 25 which commonly occur when state military forces are recruited
to protect oil operations or installations in response to local protest. 26
Recent attention to human rights violations, although long-awaited, has in
some ways served to overshadow corporate involvement in first-tier
property rights violations, which occur when local property interests are
negatively affected in the course of the extraction. 27 Oil operations initiated
20. The term “unaccountable extractions” refers to extractions carried out pursuant to an
agreement with a corporation and a governing regime in a weak governance zone that generally
does not take into account local interests and needs in decision-making.
21. See discussion infra Part II.A.
22. Id.
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.
24. Id.
25. See discussion infra Part II.A.
26. Id.
27. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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by Occidental Petroleum in Colombia, Unocal in Burma, and Shell in
Nigeria serve as three illustrations of this inverse dynamic, in which the
international community, strapped for adequate market remedies, has been
forced to target the result rather than the cause. Working backwards from
second-tier violations, which have been the focus of recent scrutiny, 28 helps
reveal the severe effects and importance of accounting for first-tier property
rights violations.
A. SECOND-TIER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The dynamics of second-tier human rights violations are exemplified by
corporate involvement in the oil-rich north-eastern region of Arauca in
Colombia. 29 The region has experienced protracted instability,
militarization, and abuse of civilian populations, due in part to competing
oil interests between government forces, paramilitary auxiliaries, and
guerilla insurgents. 30 The U.S. company Occidental Petroleum (Occidental)
intervened in this complex set of relationships in affiliation with the
Colombian government. Occidental began pumping oil in Colombia in
1985 based on an “association contract” with Ecopetrol, a state oil company
that owned fifty percent of the pipeline. 31 After more than 900 attacks on

28. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., for example, a district court examined allegations of murder,
assault, rape, torture, forced labor, and destruction of homes and property brought by local farmers
who challenged Unocal’s extractive operations in the Burma. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp.
880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
29. Colombia constitutes a weak governance zone by virtue of its ongoing internal conflict. As
Amnesty International noted in 2004, “Colombia has spent most of the last 50 years under various
states of emergency through which constitutional guarantees have been side-stepped, governments
have ruled by executive decree, and the military have been granted broad powers to deal with
public order issues. This has led to widespread, flagrant human rights violations.” AI COLOMBIA
REPORT, supra note 7, at 3.
30. The emergence of guerilla groups during La Violencia in the 1950’s resulted in the
consolidation of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionares de Colombia (FARC) in 1966, which is
now the largest guerilla group in Colombia established to protect the pro-liberal sectors within the
country. AI COLOMBIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 4–5. The second largest guerilla group is the
Ejército de Liberación Nacional. Id. These groups have secured control over various local
governments, establishing strongholds, extorting rural estates, and launching increasing attacks on
civilian populations. Id. During its counter-insurgency operations, the Colombian army has
depended on private armed paramilitary groups, which have been implicated in the majority of
civilian killings and disappearances. Id. To circumvent liability, the armed forces have used these
paramilitary auxiliaries to outsource the pursuit of their aims through illegal conduct. Id. As a
result all three groups—the guerillas, the government armed forces, and the paramilitary groups—
have abused civilians, often in pursuit of profits linked to the oil-rich north-eastern department of
Arauca. Id. Because of its strategic importance, Arauca has become a highly militarized zone. Id.
The government has experimented with various security policies in the region, paramilitaries have
likewise clamped down to secure domestic and international interests in conjunction with
government armed forces, and FARC has responded by heightening intimidation of the civilian
population.
31. Occidental owns the second half along with Repson-YPF, a Spanish company. Id. at 6–7.
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the pipeline following its drilling operations, 32 Occidental began funding
the Eighteenth Brigade, the local army unit, providing helicopters, fuel,
uniforms, vehicles, and approximately $750,000 a year for “logistical
support.” 33 The Eighteenth Brigade has since been accused of various
abuses including cooperation with paramilitary groups in the abduction and
killing of alleged guerilla supporters. 34
The oil-rich Niger Delta region of southern Nigeria has similarly been
plagued by escalating conflict surrounding oil production. 35 In the 1990’s,
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) mobilized
the Ogonis to challenge federal distribution of oil revenues and the
activities of Shell in the region. Following protests at its facilities, Shell
closed production. 36 Members of the Ogoni tribe were detained, beaten, and
summarily executed by the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force,
which, like the Eighteenth Brigade, was created to suppress protests. 37
In Burma, 38 Unocal Corporation entered into an agreement with the
government to initiate the Yadana gas pipeline project, which was worth an
estimated $1.2 billion. 39 Unocal and one of its subsidiaries are believed to
have hired the State Law and Restoration Council (SLORC) 40 to help build
its offshore drilling stations for the purpose of extracting natural gas from
the Andaman Sea to transport gas from Burma to Thailand. 41 Affected
farmers in the Tenasserim region of Burma subsequently brought suit

32. T. Christian Miller, A Colombian Village Caught in a Cross-Fire, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2002, at A-1, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0317-01.htm.
33. Id. U.S. funds have gone towards the creation of the Fifth Mobile Brigade, which was
created specifically to protect the pipeline. AI COLOMBIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
34. While Occidental denied paying for arms, it is unclear how the corporation controlled or
channeled the use of its funds by the Eighteenth Brigade. Miller, supra note 32. British Petroleum
similarly contracted with the Colombian army for a three-year period, paying a sum of $60
million. Dufresne, supra note 7, at 344–45. In 1998, a U.S.-funded Colombian air force helicopter
bombed the village of Santo Domingo, killing seventeen civilians with U.S. munitions. AI
COLOMBIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 5–6.
35. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
36. HRW NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
37. Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the MOSOP, and eight additional Ogonis were arrested for
murder of tribal leaders and executed following a military trial. Id.
38. Following a military coup in 1962, Burma remained under military rule characterized by
widespread political oppression and economic mismanagement, with Burma’s key industries
controlled by military-run enterprises. BBC News Country Profile: Burma,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300003.stm.
39. Unocal Pays Out on Burma Abuses, BBC NEWS, Mar. 22, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4371995.stm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
40. In 1990, following multi-party elections, the military junta, the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) refused to recognize the National League for Democracy’s
electoral victory, preventing the party from taking political office. BBC News Country Profile:
Burma, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300003.stm; SLORC Coup in
Burma, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/slorc.htm.
41. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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alleging murder, assault, rape, torture, forced labor, and destruction of
homes and property. 42
In each of these cases, the focus on corporate complicity in second-tier
human rights violations 43 has often overshadowed the root causes of such
violations and corporate involvement in creating the environment for such
abuses by initiating first-tier property rights violations.
B. FIRST-TIER PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
In Colombia, Nigeria, and Burma, second-tier human rights violations
such as detentions, killings, beatings, and summary executions have often
been a product of first-tier property violations. Local property rights are
adversely affected by unaccountable extractions in several ways. Violations
include interference with ancestral land, 44 taking of property without
compensation, 45 lack of adequate profit-sharing, 46 failure to follow through
in development agreements, 47 and failure to account evenly for competing
tribal property interests during the negotiation process. 48
The use of ancestral lands for natural resource explorations has posed
particular problems for indigenous groups. 49 As the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has noted: “[T]he problems encountered by
an Indian population as a result of relocation can affect that population
seriously, considering the special ties they have with their original lands. In
the Indian’s complex scheme of values, what gives meaning to life is its
intrinsic connection with their land . . . .” 50
For indigenous groups, communal land rights are frequently crucial to
cultural preservation. 51 Thus, self-determination struggles have been
perceived as encompassing “the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources.” 52 The principle serves as a means for newly independent
42. Id. at 883.
43. See discussion infra Part III.
44. See Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid State-Corporate Enterprise and Violations of

Indigenous Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility and Accountability Under
International Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 135, 136 (2007) (highlighting indigenous rights to
ancestral lands).
45. See Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 885.
46. See AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 4; see also Maassarani, supra note 6, at 138–40.
49. Miranda, supra note 44, at 136.
50. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights
of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, 27 (Nov. 29, 1983).
51. Id.
52. This principle is characterized as follows: “Peoples and nations must have the authority to
manage and control their natural resources and in doing so to enjoy the benefits of their
development and conservation.” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Commission on the
Promotion & Protection of Human Rights, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Erica Irene A.
Daes, Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 (July 13, 2004) [hereinafter ECOSOC Report on Indigenous Peoples].
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states to preserve economic sovereignty against inequitable contracts
between external states and companies. 53 For example, in 1995, Colombia
granted an oil exploration license to Occidental of Colombia, a subsidiary
of Occidental. 54 The government’s license authorized Occidental to drill on
the ancestral lands of the indigenous U’wa people. 55 While the exploration
proved futile, the license disregarded the specialized rights of the U’wa
people to their ancestral lands and exposed them to future susceptibility to
similar explorations. 56
Even where ancestral land rights are not at issue, corporations such as
Unocal are frequently accused of failing to compensate communities for
land taken. 57 As a result of the agreement between Unocal and the SLORC,
individuals in the Tenasserim region were either forced to relocate from
their place of residence, forced to contribute labor and property, or
subjected to various forms of violence. 58 Local populations, such as the
Tenasserim farmers, often lose twofold: first, when their property is taken
by foreign industries, and second, when profits earned from the extractive
operations are not reinvested in the affected community. 59 In Nigeria, for
example, while ninety-eight percent of the country’s foreign exchange
earnings are derived from oil revenues, constituting nearly eighty percent of
the country’s budget, the people of the Niger Delta see little of this
revenue. 60 Despite high profit earnings, local communities often continue to
live at the poverty level without adequate infrastructure: electricity supplies
are erratic, water quality is poor, and the ongoing burning of gas continues
to contaminate the local environment. 61
Corporations that do agree to provide some form of compensation often
refuse to follow through on development agreements, 62 or fail to take into
53. Id. This right is derived from common article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “All
peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. . . . In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” Id; see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(2), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95–2 (1978), 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
54. Miranda, supra note 44, at 136.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 137.
57. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
58. It was believed that joint venturists, “through the SLORC military, intelligence and/or
police forces, have used and continue to use violence and intimidation to relocate whole villages,
enslave farmers living in the area of the proposed pipeline, and steal farmers’ property for the
benefit of the pipeline.” Id. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., plaintiffs challenged the corporation’s
contract with the SLORC, arguing that, as a function of this contract, “SLORC soldiers forced
farmers to relocate their villages, confiscated property and forced inhabitants to clear forest, level
the pipeline route, build headquarters for pipeline employees, prepare military outposts and carry
supplies and equipment.” Id. at 885.
59. See AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2–3.
62. Id.
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account the complex tribal distribution of property interests and
consequently exclude interested communities from negotiations for oil
exploration. 63 Protesters in the Niger Delta, for example, have challenged
Chevron Nigeria’s failure to provide jobs and development projects in
exchange for a “non-disruptive operating environment” agreed to under a
Memorandum of Understanding between the protestors and the company.64
Communities that protest or obstruct oil production have been targeted by
security forces, which have razed communities and killed civilians. 65 In the
village of Odioma in Nigeria, seventeen individuals were reportedly killed
by government forces in retaliation for the killing of local councilors. 66
Eighty percent of homes were subsequently razed. 67 The violence can be
linked to a dispute between neighboring communities over control of land
sought for oil exploration. 68 Shell Nigeria’s compensation of one
constituency at the expense of others exacerbated local tensions. 69
Looking at the various ways in which unaccountable extractions
adversely affect local property interests, it is clear that a key underlying
element of the ensuing human rights violations is the initial first-tier
property violations. 70 Corporations that have used shareholder assets to
initiate such extractions implicate not only the ownership rights of the
shareholders but also the ownership rights of the local communities. 71 An
emerging contemporary corporate social responsibility regime is now
encouraging accountability in these various contexts. 72 Because the
discourse has focused on second-tier human rights violations, it has been
framed largely as an issue of corporate social responsibility, focusing on
human rights principles. As a result, emerging legal remedies have provided
little opportunity to address first-tier property violations, the root cause of
the problem.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 4–5
Id. at 4.
AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. Violence erupted in the village of Odioma in Nigeria when a Joint Task Force raided
the community in search of a vigilante group suspected of killing local counselors. Amnesty
International noted that the violence was a result of conflict between communities within the same
ethnic group over control of the land designated for oil exploration. After identifying two specific
communities as the landowners, Shell Nigeria had to withdraw from the area when it learned that
ownership of the land was in dispute. Id. at 4–5.
69. Id.
70. In 2005, the Joint Task Force, which was also a government security force created to
protect major oil installations, fired on protesters at an oil terminal operated by Chevron Nigeria.
Id. at 3. As Robert Dufresne explains, “In response to the expression of despair and social
outrage, and to the voicing of socio-political claims, military or police interventions are
undertaken to defend the disturbed concessions and to uphold concretely the conditions for the
exercise of exploitation of prerogatives.” Dufresne, supra note 7, at 336.
71. Miranda, supra note 44, at 136.
72. See SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 7–8.
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III. PROTECTION GAPS IN THE EMERGING ACCOUNTABILITY
REGIME: THE LIMITED JURISDICTIONAL GRANT OF THE
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
The emerging legal architecture that is being erected under the umbrella
of a corporate social responsibility regime represents a crucial step forward
in addressing the egregious violations that have occurred at the hands of
extractive industries. 73 In the United States, the ATCA provides a civil
human rights remedy, giving federal courts original jurisdiction over civil
actions brought by aliens for torts that qualify as a violation of the law of
nations. 74 Similarly, the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA)
establishes civil liability, irrespective of citizenship, for any individual who,
under the authority of a foreign nation, subjects another to torture or
extrajudicial killings. 75 While statutory instruments such as the ATCA and
the TVPA have provided innovative legal remedies to address human rights
violations in federal courts, 76 courts have narrowly construed their
jurisdiction to extend to a limited set of abuses. 77 The end result is that
courts can address a limited set of second-tier human rights abuses and are
circumscribed, if not explicitly prohibited, from reaching first-tier property
rights violations within this statutory framework.
While the ATCA opened the door for federal courts to adjudicate
certain violations recognized under international law, 78 it remained unclear
which acts constituted violations of the law of nations. Subsequent case law
has played a central role in clarifying the breadth of applicable violations.
In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 79 a physician in Paraguay brought suit under the
ATCA against the former Inspector General of Police in Paraguay for
torturing his son in retaliation for his political opposition to the government
of President Alfredo Stroessner. 80 The Second Circuit found perpetration of
torture in an official capacity sufficient to grant federal jurisdiction. 81 In
granting jurisdiction, the court in Filártiga nonetheless read the ATCA as
providing narrow jurisdiction to adjudicate only a margin of acceptable
claims involving “well-established, universally recognized norms of
international law.” 82

73. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 188 (2002).
74. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
75. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
76. See Collingsworth, supra note 73, at 188.
77. See Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic
Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401 405–06 (2001).
78. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
79. See generally id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 888.
82. Id.
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In Doe v. Unocal Corp., 83 where Burmese farmers in the Tenasserim
region brought suit against Unocal challenging the Yadana gas pipeline
project, the district court reiterated adherence to the high threshold set by
the Second Circuit in Filártiga. 84 As discussed, farmers alleged that the
conduct of Unocal and its local subsidiary had resulted in forced
displacement, confiscation of property, forced labor and torture. 85 Rejecting
the expropriation claims, the court found that claims of torture and forced
labor constituted violations of the laws of nations, triggering federal
jurisdiction under the ATCA. 86 Building upon the Second Circuit’s
important precedent, the court found that even absent state conduct, private
enterprise could be held liable because the allegation of forced labor fell
within the set of crimes “for which the law of nations attributes individual
responsibility.” 87 While the court’s interpretation of the law of nations
extended the ATCA’s applicability to private enterprises, it stopped short of
extending such applicability to private rights. 88
This distinction between private and public rights was previously
emphasized by the Second Circuit in Dreyfus v. von Finck. 89 In Dreyfus, the
court dismissed a complaint brought by a Swiss citizen seeking recovery
against citizens of West Germany on claims of “wrongful confiscation of
property in Nazi Germany in 1938.” 90 The court found that “[d]efendants’
conduct, tortious though it may have been, was not a violation of the law of
nations, which governs civilized states in their dealings with each other.” 91
Here, the court suggested that violations of the law of nations did not
encompass violations of private rights. Similarly, in Bigio v. Coca-Cola, the
Second Circuit found that Canadian citizens had not established subject
matter jurisdiction under the ATCA in alleging that a Delaware corporation
had purchased or leased property knowing that it had been unlawfully
seized by the Egyptian government based on religious discrimination. 92 The
court found that a corporation could not be held responsible for a state’s

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
Id. at 883, 891–92.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 891–92. The Second Circuit had previously held that “the ATCA reaches the conduct
of private parties provided that their conduct is undertaken under the color of state authority or
violates a norm of international law that is recognized as extending to the conduct of private
parties.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–40, 245 (2d Cir. 1995)).
88. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 884 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
89. Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (Plaintiff was forced to leave Germany
and sold his interest in Dreyfus. He alleged that the transaction took place under duress with the
price substantially lower than the actual value of the stock.).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 31.
92. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 444, 447 (2d Cir. 2000).
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“discriminatory expropriation of property,” and that such conduct did not
amount to an act “of universal concern.” 93
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 94 the Supreme Court confirmed this
closed-door approach, 95 cautioning against “adapting the law of nations to
private rights” in the absence of congressional action. 96 Because courts
retain only a narrow margin of discretion in interpreting violations of
international law, they often have limited or no jurisdiction over these
initial first-tier violations. 97 As Beth Stephens notes, “human rights and
humanitarian law violations such as genocide, summary execution, war
crimes and crimes against humanity, disappearance, slavery and forced
labor trigger jurisdiction under the ATCA,” whereas other claims, such as
those “based on expropriation of property,” fall outside this jurisdiction. 98
Because this statutory scheme extends only to a small margin of violations
that have achieved the level of international consensus, it falls short of
addressing the wide range of property violations that often set the stage for
second-tier human rights violations worthy of jurisdiction under the ATCA.
In addition to their narrow interpretation of acts constituting violations
of the law of nations, courts have also inferred particular bars to
adjudicating the validity of foreign conduct. The act of state doctrine, which
suggests that “the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own
jurisdiction . . . be deemed valid,” is one basis on which to argue against
judicial interference with respect to foreign conduct. 99 Although the scope
of this doctrine remains unclear, some have found that judicial interference
is valid up until the point where “adjudication of the matter will bring the
nation into hostile confrontation with the foreign state.” 100 In Unocal, the
court did not find that this line had been crossed with regards to allegations
of torture and forced labor because the U.S. government had already
criticized Burma for its human rights abuses and it was therefore “hard to
imagine how judicial consideration of the matter [would] so substantially
exacerbate relations as to cause ‘hostile confrontation.’” 101 Because
93. Id. at 448.
94. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004) (Humberto Alvarez-Machain, who

was indicted for the torture and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official and
later acquitted, challenged his abduction in Mexico under a plan authorized by the DEA using
Mexican nationals to seize him and bring him to the United States).
95. Id. at 725. The court found that that prohibitions against arbitrary arrest also fell short of
the ATCA’s requirements.
96. Id.
97. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 509 F.3d 148, (2d Cir. 2007).
98. Stephens, supra note 77, at 405–06.
99. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 893 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
100. Id.
101. Id. The court additionally reasoned that:
[B]ecause nations do not, and cannot under international law, claim a right to torture or
enslave their own citizens, a finding that a nation has committed such acts, particularly
where, as here, that finding comports with the prior conclusions of the coordinate
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consideration of whether a state is acting in the public interest factors into
this doctrine, considerably more deference is afforded to states
expropriating land as opposed to committing torture. 102 It has been argued,
for example, that “‘instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its chosen means
of allocating and profiting from its own valuable natural resources’ would
affront the sovereignty of a state.” 103 Because state land expropriations can
be justified, often pretextually, on public interest grounds in a way that
torture cannot, such expropriations fall more easily within the deferential
act of state doctrine, 104 further limiting judicial determinations of first-tier
violations.
While the ATCA provides an important opportunity to hold
corporations liable for violations of international law, its narrow
jurisdictional grant coupled with limiting principles such as the act of state
doctrine leaves substantial gaps, if not barriers, in terms of preventative
remedies. In the case of Burma, property claims were expressly preempted
and the local community had to rely on traditional human rights claims to
assert their rights. Similarly in Nigeria, petitioners in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. alleged first-tier violations, claiming that Shell Nigeria
“coercively appropriated land for oil development without adequate
compensation, and caused substantial pollution of the air and water in the
homeland of the Ogoni people.” 105 Their claim, however, also hinged
primarily on allegations that Shell Nigeria orchestrated attacks involving
torture and extrajudicial killings to suppress local opposition to drilling in
the region. 106 The Second Circuit’s focus on petitioners’ claims of torture
and extrajudicial killings in rejecting the corporations’ forum non
conveniens claims 107 further suggests that under the ATCA, first tier
property rights will only be addressed indirectly insofar as they result in
second-tier human rights claims.
Given the private nature of property rights in the United States and the
deference afforded to states in land appropriations, it seems improbable that
courts will be able to address land expropriations under this framework,
absent torture or extrajudicial killings. Despite the groundbreaking
achievements of recent litigation under the ATCA, the statute’s limitations
in the context of underlying property violations suggest that while it has
become a necessary remedy, it remains an insufficient one. The increasing
branches of government, should have no detrimental effect on the polices underlying
the act of the state doctrine.
Id. at 884.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Lui v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989)).
104. Unocal Corp, 963 F. Supp. at 893.
105. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000)
106. Id.
107. Id.
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promotion of a social and economic rights approach will serve as one way
of further incorporating property principles within the realm of public
protections. However, the lack of substantial consensus in this area suggests
that, in the short-run, the responsibility for protecting private rights may rest
more appropriately in the private sphere.
IV. CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY’S DIVORCE FROM
TRADITIONAL FREE MARKET PRINCIPLES
In identifying private remedies for private rights violations, the key
starting point is to determine whether corporations carry out their extractive
operations in developing countries in a manner consistent with their key
governance principles. In prioritizing principles of voluntary ownership and
contracting, U.S. corporations adhere generally to a shareholder primacy
model, under which the corporation serves primarily to maximize the
shareholder’s profits. 108 In assessing the use of this model in the context of
natural resource extractions in weak governance zones, it becomes
immediately evident that corporations have, to some extent, abandoned
precisely the principles governing ownership and contracting that justified a
shareholder primacy approach in the first place.
Corporate contracts with unrepresentative regimes violate three free
market principles underlying shareholder primacy: (1) informed and
voluntary contracting; (2) the separation of economic power and political
authority; and (3) the centrality of private property protections. 109 This free
market contradiction creates problematic distortions in the corporation’s
role, often turning the corporation into a political actor and the local
community into an involuntary investor. Where such distortions emerge,
corporations can no longer rely on shareholder primacy to justify their
conduct until such conduct is reconciled with the free market principles that
justified shareholder primacy to begin with.
A. THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY MODEL
Under the prevailing shareholder primacy model of corporate
governance, shareholders are collectively perceived, by virtue of their

108. Under a shareholder primacy model of corporate governance, the corporate entity serves
first and foremost to promote the interests of shareholders. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 277–78 (1998); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (2002).
109. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1990, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=
F10F11FB3E5810718EDDAA0994D1405B808BF1D3&scp=1&sq=the%20social%20responsibil
ity%20of%20business%20is%20to%20increase%20its%20profits&st=cse (subscription required)
[hereinafter The Social Responsibility of Business].
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investments, as the owners of the corporation, 110 while the corporation is
often perceived as “a nexus of contracts” between managers, shareholders
and other constituents. 111 Property protection and voluntary contracting are
thus two central principles underlying corporate governance. 112 Because
shareholders are the owners, the corporation must be “primarily run for
[their] pecuniary benefit,” 113 serving to protect their investments and
maximize shareholder wealth. 114 Under this scheme, managers are
frequently prevented or discouraged from acting in the interest of nonshareholder constituencies unless doing so would be in the best interests of
the shareholders themselves. 115
Because equity owners give decision-making authority to corporate
agents, their expectation of profit maximization is protected by a system of
fiduciary duty. In what Antoine Rebérioux refers to as a “philosophy of
dispossession,” shareholders, who must vest control in corporate
110. Antoine Rebérioux, Shareholder Primacy and Managerial Accountability, Comparative
Research in Law and Political Economy, CLPE Research Paper 1/2007 Vol. 03, No. 01, 1 (2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=961290. The dynamics of the shareholder primacy model are
described by Milton Friedman as follows:
In a free-enterprise, private property system, a corporate executive is an employee of
the owners of the business. He has a direct responsibility to his employers. That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic
rules of the society, both those embodied in the law and those embodied in ethical
custom.
The Social Responsibility of Business, supra note 109.
111. Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: a Proposed Corporate
Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 592
(1997).
112. Id. at 590–94.
113. Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation,
and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1278–83 (1991).
114. Rebérioux, supra note 110, at 2; see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the
Firm:
Managerial
Behavior,
Agency
Costs
and
Ownership
Structure,
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=94043 (for an analysis of the benefits of a shareholder profit
maximization approach).
115. The extent of the doctrine’s protections of shareholder interest at the cost of managerial
discretion was illustrated in the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling in Dodge v. Ford Motor
Company. Where shareholders sought to compel seventy-five percent of the company’s cash
surplus against the director’s decision to reinvest profits into the company, the court found that
refusal to pay special dividends did not fall within a director’s discretion and thus constituted an
arbitrary refusal. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 510 (1919). The court reasoned
that:
[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end. . .it is
not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs of
a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary
purpose of benefiting others . . . .
Id. at 507.
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executives, counter their dispossession by retaining some influence over
managers’ decision-making. 116 Managers are held to a “triad of primary
fiduciary duties:” 117 duties of due care, loyalty, and good faith. 118 This triad
essentially requires directors to act in the best interest of the corporation,
refrain from self-dealing, and remain honest. 119 Where there is a conflict of
interest with other constituencies of the corporation, shareholder interests
generally prevail. 120
As discussed, the shareholder primacy model is premised on the
importance of protecting ownership rights of investors based on a matrix of
contractual relationships. 121 Milton Friedman has identified the key set of
free market principles underlying the corporate form as follows:
In an ideal free market resting on private property, no individual can
coerce any other, all cooperation is voluntary, all parties to such
cooperation benefit or they need not participate. There are no values, no
“social” responsibilities in any sense other than the shared values and
responsibilities of individuals. 122

Irrespective of broader social responsibilities, the principles underlying
corporate governance implicate a political or legal regime, or what will be
referred to here as corporate free market responsibility. As explained by
Friedman, this regime provides a series of interconnected underlying
assumptions and individual protections: (1) informed and voluntary
contracting and on some voluntary exit; 123 (2) the separation of economic
power and political authority, which if consolidated adds a coercive element
that can delegitimize the voluntary nature of a transaction; 124 and (3) private
property protections, which rest definition of property rights. 125 While the
shareholder primacy model is premised on these three free market
principles, the legitimacy of the model is called into question when
corporations engage in unaccountable extractions that stray from these
116. Rebérioux, supra note 110, at 5.
117. Williams, supra note 19, at 88 (citing Malone v. Brincat, 772 A.2d 5, 12–13 (Del. 1998)).
118. A general duty of disclosure is encompassed in the triad requiring directors to “provide the

stockholders with accurate and complete information material to a transaction or other corporate
event that is being presented to them for action.” Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: A Corporate Director’s
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAN. L. REV. 1087, 1100 (1996).
119. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30(a) (2002).
120. Smith, supra note 108, at 282 (citing David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law:
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, Progressive Corporate Law 35, 1 (Lawrence E. Mitchell
ed., 1995)). In the context of corporate takeovers, states have adopted nonshareholder
constituencies statutes that allow managers to take into account the interests of customers,
suppliers and employees in determining the interest of the corporation. Id. at 289.
121. Leung, supra note 111, at 590–94.
122. The Social Responsibility of Business, supra note 109.
123. Id.
124. CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 115–16.
125. Id. at 27.
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underpinnings. In such a context, these principles, while maintained with
regard to shareholders, do not extend to local communities, whose interests
often go unprotected by both the government and the corporation. As a
result, contracts between a corporation and a foreign government deny local
landowners of their property absent voluntary contracting and under
substantial coercion. This gap in protection calls into question the
legitimacy of a contract that uses coercive means in the name of the free
market. In order to better address this gap, it is necessary to explore each of
these free market principles and the ways in which corporations have
diverged from them by engaging in unaccountable extractions.
1. Not-So-Voluntary Contracting
Generally, transaction costs will be too high for a corporation to
contract with individual communities, 126 so instead the corporation
contracts with the government, which retains sovereignty over the country’s
natural resources. 127 Because government officials contract on behalf of
their country’s citizens, the voluntary nature of that contract does not
depend solely on whether the officials entered into the contract voluntarily,
but on whether they did so as a matter of public welfare as opposed to
personal gain. 128 Certain public harms that result from government
contracts may be justified as products of a representative political process
that is meant to facilitate fair distribution of public costs and benefits. 129 In
the case of unrepresentative regimes, however, a bilateral arrangement
between a corporation and the government that is voluntary and informed
126. See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 54–56 (6th ed. 2002).
127. ECOSOC Report on Indigenous Peoples, supra note 52, at 5.
128. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increasingly held corporations

accountable for bribing state officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In 2006, the SEC
entered final judgment against corporate employees operating in Nigeria for paying approximately
one million dollars in bribes to Nigerian government officials in pursuit of a contract for an oil
drilling project. Margaret Ayres, John Davis, Nicole Healy & Alexandria Wrage, Developments in
U.S. and International Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 41 INT’L LAW 597, 600–01 (Summer 2007).
The parties were charged civil monetary penalties. Id. Additionally, the SEC also brought a civil
action against a former employee of Willbros, a public oilfield services company, for bribery
schemes in Nigeria and Ecuador. Id. at 602.
129. As Bruce Ackerman notes, “welfare gains can rarely be purchased without social cost—
though many may gain, some will lose as a result of the new governmental initiative.” BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1977). In the United States, the
Constitution’s Takings Clause has been designed particularly to address problems of equitable
distribution and potential misuse of eminent domain, requiring that property be taken only for
public use and with just compensation. While the legal interpretations of these two requirements
are complex, their mere existence, indicates that the government does not retain complete
discretion when it takes property. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation”). As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky note:
“Assuming that democratic mechanisms make public officials accountable for budget
management, compensation is important to create a budgetary effect that forces governments to
internalize the costs that their decisions impose on private resource holders.” Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 580 (2001).
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with respect to the government is generally not voluntary and informed with
respect to the people living on the land or in the surrounding area, as
illustrated in both Colombia and Burma. 130 In each of these cases, the
contract was made by the corporation in pursuit of investor interests,
whereas the local populations, whose land was a crucial investment in the
venture, had no opportunity for voluntary choice. 131 They were not
contracted with directly, they were not represented or compensated by the
contracting government, and their property interests were not accounted for
by the corporation itself. 132
Under contract law, “[f]reedom of will is essential to the validity of an
agreement.” 133 A contract will be invalidated in cases of duress or undue
influence, where such free will is compromised. 134 The circumstances of
unaccountable extractions are analogous given that the absence of free will
is actually more exaggerated: certain groups are not only intimidated but
completely excluded from the process. 135 A corporation should therefore
seriously reconsider the legitimacy of its contracts with an unrepresentative
regime when it has reasonable grounds to believe that state contractors were
not acting within the best interests of affected communities. 136 Neglect of
accountability gaps has led to costly malfunctions such as violent protests
and repressive state activity, often in the form of human rights abuses,
including torture, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial
killings. 137 These forms of state abuse are further exacerbated where
corporate influence dictates further consolidation and concentration of
political and economic power.
2. The Corporation as a Political Entity
The corporation’s pursuit of shareholder interests becomes further
divorced from free market principles where corporate activity is politicized,

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See discussion supra Part II.
Id.
Id.
17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 218 (2008).
Id.
See discussion supra Part II on the exclusion of interested parties in Odioma, Nigeria.
In analyzing odious debt, for example, Thomas Palley has argued that:

[an] important measure for guarding against looting via financial markets is the legal
doctrine of odious debt. The core idea is that where: (1) loans are made to illegitimate
regimes, such as those that come to power undemocratically; (2) loans are not secured
for the benefit of the people; and (3) lenders could reasonably have known about [such]
conditions . . . then such loans can be deemed illegitimate and unenforceable.
Thomas I. Palley, Lifting the Natural Resource Curse, FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL (Dec. 2003),
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/generaldebate/2003/12curse.htm.
137. HRW NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 14, 164.
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threatening a coercive consolidation of political and economic power. 138 As
Friedman explains:
[By] removing the organization of economic activity from the control of
political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power. It
enables economic strength to be a check to political power rather than a
reinforcement * * * if economic power is kept in separate hands from
political power, it can serve as a check and a counter to political power. 139

This approach, while minimizing government involvement, is not
meant to eliminate it. 140 Instead, it designates the government as an
essential “umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on” and to
accordingly “minimize the extent to which government need participate
directly in the game.” 141 In the United States, government protections come
in various forms, from state and federal regulations to protections of private
property under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 142
The separation of economic and political authority, crucial to
Friedman’s competitive capitalist regime, breaks down when corporations
contract with non-representative governments to serve a security function.
Both corporations and local governments have incentives to preempt the
development of legal infrastructure that may inhibit the scope of their
operations. 143 Government leaders, who are not required to distribute
revenues, stand to gain substantial profits irrespective of whether the local
communities sustain substantial losses. 144 Therefore, corporations
frequently have incentives to bribe state actors in pursuit of their goals.145
Corporations cease being purely economic entities where their profits
depend, in part, on being able to operate in economies uninhibited by the
rule of law and where they use their economic power to preempt the state
from evolving into Friedman’s regulating “umpire.” 146
Corporations further blur the line by interfering in local conflict
dynamics when they recruit government security forces, which may already
be in conflict with other local factions. 147 As financial contributors, they
138. 1000 corporations produce eighty percent of the world industrial output. Blankenburg,
supra note 1. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
fifty-one of the world’s largest economies are no longer states but corporations. SARAH
ANDERSON & JOHN CAVANAGH, TOP 200: THE RISE OF GLOBAL CORPORATE POWER (2000),
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/top200.pdf.
139. CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 2, at 27.
140. Id. at 115.
141. Id.
142. JAMES W. ELY, Jr., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 54–56 (1998).
143. See generally Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, OXFORD
ECONOMIC PAPERS 56 (2004).
144. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
146. See generally Collier & Hoeffler, supra note 143.
147. See discussion supra Part II.
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may empower one side of a domestic conflict in pursuit of shareholder
profits. 148 The corporation’s purely commercial role is undermined when it
contracts with one side of a party to an internal conflict for the protection of
a pipeline in a way that alters the conflict dynamics. As Robert Dufresne
notes:
The involvement of oil companies in internal violence reaches a more
significant level when rebels, in order to counter the empowerment of
governments that have contracted with oil corporations, directly attack oil
concessions or pipelines. Then, rather than being simply part of the
working conditions of a larger system that—to a certain and not
insignificant degree—oil companies can claim not to control, their
activities become directly involved in the dynamics of internal violence. In
a sense, the defense of pipelines and of oil concessions is the material
threshold that defeats the oil companies’ argument that they are
uninvolved in conflicts and merely carrying out commercial interaction. 149

In Sudan, for example, revenues earned by the government in
Khartoum through contracts with companies such as Chevron contributed to
the government’s weapons stockpile. 150 As “participants in the web of local
interactions,” corporations become “a means for the pursuit of local
political objectives.” 151 Taking a place within the military web politicizes
corporate activity.
In failing to take into account the social realities of extracting resources
from countries with unrepresentative and unaccountable political
infrastructure, corporate governance structures facilitate exactly the type of
consolidation of political and economic power that the free market system
seeks to avoid. The absence of voluntary contracting, coupled with the
coercive nature of corporate conduct, severely undermines the legitimacy of
the corporation’s interference with local property interests.
3. Private Property Protections and Dispossession of the
Involuntary Investor
By sidestepping local property interests in pursuit of profit
maximization, the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance
prioritizes the protection of property interests linked to formal investments
(shareholder interests) while blindly discounting the property interests
linked to other corporate assets (local community interests). Shareholders
may argue that where local property protections are lacking, it is the
responsibility of the state and not the corporation to account for them. In
this case, however, it is the corporation and not the foreign regime that
148.
149.
150.
151.

Dufresne, supra note 7, at 344.
Id.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 346.
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bases the legitimacy of its conduct on respect for ownership and voluntary
contracting. Placing the burden on the state ultimately reduces free market
principles to a principle of double standards. 152
The shareholder primacy model, in placing a premium on investor
interests, incorrectly presumes that the unaccountable state is a valid
transactional partner and that the absence of formal property rights
extinguishes the need to recognize such rights. However, property
ownership, which is a basic foundation of the shareholder primacy model,
has historically been “viewed as establishing the economic basis for
freedom from governmental coercion and the enjoyment of liberty.” 153 For
example, in the United States, constitutional checks on self-interested
governmental takings have been put in place under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, which requires that property be taken only for a
public use and in exchange for just compensation. 154 The Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process clause places an additional check, which, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, prohibits arbitrary and unreasonable
deprivations of property. 155 These protections of private property do not
exist in a vacuum, but rather are grounded in a representative system of
government. 156
In the case of unaccountable extractions, such checks are lacking. The
contract is frequently motivated by self-interest, excludes the interests of
the local communities, and is particularly coercive in nature. 157 Government
officials, acting on their own behalf, often pocket the profits from the
contract. 158 The corporation’s use of that property in these cases is no
different than a coercive taking or an arbitrary deprivation of property on
behalf of the corporation and the government. Thus, while the Second
Circuit in Bigio may not have found that a U.S. corporation utilizing
152. Mark Gibney and R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
and the Protection of Human Rights: Hold Multinational Corporations to Domestic and
International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT’L COMP. L.J. 123, 145 (1996) (“There is one set of
standards—legal and moral—in domestic operations; but a completely different and much lower
set of standards when these same entities are operating abroad, particularly in much poorer
countries. This dichotomy is wrong, and the governments in the industrialized world have the
means of preventing it; by applying extraterritorially many of the domestic and international
standards that are adopted and enforced at home.”).
153. Ely, supra note 142, at 3.
154. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926) (“it must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare”).
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (setting forth election standards and process for the House of
Representatives, who are to be chosen “by the People of the several States”); U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII (setting forth election standards and process for the Senate).
157. HRW NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 6, 8–9.
158. See Douglas Anele, Nigeria: On Obasanjo and His Critics, VANGUARD, Mar. 20, 2008,
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200803240161.html.
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unlawfully expropriated land had violated the law of nations, the
corporation had nonetheless violated its own free market principles.
Additionally, the shareholder primacy model fails to reconcile the role
of involuntary investors. In the context of unaccountable extractions, the
local community takes on the anomalous role of an involuntary investor.
Antoine Rebérioux’s “philosophy of dispossession,” as applied to the
shareholder, can be applied in an exaggerated form to the local community,
which is dispossessed of its property without initial approval and without
retaining control. 159 Ironically, the corporation accounts for this
dispossession with regard to shareholders by prioritizing shareholder
interests 160 in a way that simultaneously facilitates a corresponding and
somewhat perverse form of dispossession of local communities. To
reconcile this paradox, fiduciary duty must be reconceptualized to eliminate
the anomaly of the involuntary investor and ensure free market
responsibility. While this reconciliation is important on a conceptual level,
it also serves to address the monetary, reputational, and legitimacy costs
that tend to result when property violations lead to destabilizing and violent
unrest. 161 Free market fairness principles are not simply a social construct
or moral imperative but rather a practical recognition that unfairness often
sparks violence, and violence can be costly. 162
V. CORPORATE FREE MARKET RESPONSIBILITY:
RECONCILING CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO
ACCOUNT FOR THE INVOLUNTARY INVESTOR
A corporation’s failure to take into account the costs and risks of doing
business with unaccountable regimes can result in unaccounted and
substantial costs to involuntary investors in the form of security costs, lower
growth prospects, and changes to planned investments. 163 Recognition of
this reality requires reconsideration of corporate fiduciary duty as applied in
the context of unaccountable extractions. As John Ruggie has warned,
“[h]istory demonstrates that without adequate institutional underpinnings
markets will fail to deliver their full benefits and may even become socially
unsustainable.” 164 Corporations acting in weak governance zones must
159.
160.
161.
162.

See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
Deborah Rhode, Profits and Professionalism, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 49, 54–55 (2005).
In the Warri region, oil companies originally reached an agreement with the Itsekiri leader,
ignoring ownership claims of the Ijaw and Urhobo. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. Based
on the ensuing violence surrounding the oil installations, Chevron has sustained substantial
financial losses estimated at up to $500 million. Id. at 14.
163. Id.
164. SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 3 (citing John McMillan, REINVENTING THE BAZAAR: A
NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS (2002)). John Ruggie is currently the U.N. Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transitional corporations
and other business enterprises. Id. at 1.
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account for the absence of the requisite free market institutional parameters,
both for the purposes of securing the value of their investments, but also to
secure the validity of the free market approach on which their conduct is
premised. Where corporations choose to engage in natural resource
extractions, they must balance against the risk of contracting with
unaccountable regimes by broadening directors’ fiduciary duties. Such a
balancing must encompass a duty of due diligence with regard to the rights
and interests of otherwise unrepresented local communities so as to
eliminate the problematic phenomena of involuntary investments. 165
It is worth noting that the complexity of local property interests may
indeed be insurmountable and the suggested approach is not considered a
catch-all solution. Under the current framework, however, problems ensue
not simply due to the complexity of local interests, but rather from
recklessness on behalf of corporations, which fail to perform due diligence
to better understand the environment in which they are working. Classic
mistakes include the failure to take into account communal conflict over
landownership and to compensate the full range of property owners who
have interests at stake. 166
A. CURRENT APPROACHES AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
Courts have recognized the need for corporations to adapt to account
for their changing role within society and various models have been
proposed for considering broader corporate stakeholders. 167 Some courts
have chosen to interpret managerial discretion as encompassing greater
flexibility to incorporate the interests of other stakeholders. 168 Similarly, the
“mediating hierarchy model” suggests that granting directors broader
discretion to favor other constituencies actually benefits shareholders’ longterm interests. 169 However, the interests served are still limited to “members
165. While the primary duty may rest with the state, this burden shifts in part to the corporation
where its actions help preempt the emergence of states capable of upholding this duty.
166. Violence in Odioma, for example, can be linked to a dispute between neighboring
communities over control of land sought for oil exploration. Shell Nigeria’s identification of only
one constituency at the cost of others exacerbated local tensions. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note
7, at 4.
167. In A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, the Supreme Court of New Jersey validated a
corporation’s power to make contributions to academic institutions, recognizing the changing
corporate role:
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals they discharged
their responsibilities as citizens . . . with the transfer of wealth to corporate hands and
the imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, they have been unable to keep
pace with increased philanthropic needs. They have therefore, with justification, turned
to corporations to assume the modern obligations of good citizenship.
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N. J. 145, 153 (1953).
168. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173 (1968).
169. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247, 297 (1999).
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of the corporate coalition” such as shareholders, employees, and
creditors. 170
Other constituency statutes authorize directors to exercise similar
discretion. The Pennsylvania statute defining fiduciary duty, for example,
allows directors “in considering the best interests of the corporation” to
“consider the effects of any action . . . upon communities in which offices
or other establishments of the corporation are located.” 171 This has allowed
certain states to account for interests of broader constituencies. These
approaches, however, do not require corporations to take such interests into
account, imposing no duties and no liability. 172
A more compelling and relevant example is the extension of fiduciary
duties to controlling shareholders. Analogizing their influence to the control
exercised by directors, courts have extended fiduciary duties to controlling
shareholders. 173 If we similarly analogize the involuntary investments of
local communities to the voluntary investments of shareholders, it is unclear
why a parallel extension of rights should not apply to involuntary investors.
Important steps have already been taken towards this end in
reconceptualizing not only corporate stakeholders but also the extent of
directors’ fiduciary duties. Cynthia Williams and John Conley, for example,
argue that “directors’ fiduciary duties now include a duty to be aware of
human rights risks and potential violations within a company’s global
operations, and to develop policies and management procedures to reduce
the risks of such violations.” 174 This expanded notion of fiduciary duty,
however, remains a duty to traditional shareholders and a duty geared more
strongly towards second-tier human rights violations instead of first-tier
property rights violations. Friedman himself has emphasized that
corporations that invest in communities in which they are working or
improving local government in order to “lessen losses from pilferage and
sabotage” are not acting under a social responsibility, but rather upholding
community interests when they serve the best interests of the
corporations. 175 Here, it is not argued that an expanded fiduciary duty is
owed to shareholders, but that a parallel fiduciary duty is owed to local
communities who, in the context of unaccountable extractions, retain a
status analogous to shareholders. 176

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 305.
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1716 (2006).
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (2006).
See Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Del. 1994) (The
court has held that “a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty . . . if it owns a majority interest in or
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”).
174. Williams, supra note 19, at 87.
175. The Social Responsibility of Business, supra note 109.
176. See supra Part IV.
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B. A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE
The extension of a fiduciary duty of care stems from reasoning
underlying the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Fiduciary principles of loyalty
apply: “[W]here a person who is empowered to manage the property of
others for their benefit uses such property for personal benefit. In modern
corporation law, such self-dealing behavior, while not flatly forbidden, is
subject to the most searching degree of judicial scrutiny.” 177
A corporation engaged in natural resource extractions frequently uses
the property of local communities for the benefit of shareholders without
paying adequate or any compensation. 178 In such cases, the interests of
formal shareholders may conflict with those of the involuntary investors
and the transaction should be subject to rigid scrutiny. The transaction, held
to an entire fairness standard, should ensure fair dealing and a fair price for
all investors. 179 A corporation that initiates a Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU) 180 that promises local development to a local community should be
bound by that contract based on a principled free market duty to act in good
faith.
The remedy may be equally assessed within the framework of the duty
of care. In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
defined a director’s duty of care as encompassing an obligation to maintain
a rudimentary understanding of the business of the corporation, keep
informed of corporate activities, and monitor corporate affairs and
policies. 181 It reasoned that “[t]he sentinel asleep at his post contributes
nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect.” 182 Accordingly,
“[s]hareholders have the right to expect that directors will exercise
reasonable supervision and control over the policies and practices of the
corporation.” 183 For example, directors are required to make reasonable
attempts to prevent misappropriation of corporate funds. 184 Extending the
scope of this duty to require corporations to obtain greater understanding of
the community contexts and communal property interests in the areas in
which they operate serves both corporate interests and local community
interests. Corporations that seek oil exploration contracts and take into
account competing tribal claims to land may circumvent some of the
conflict that will later threaten the stability of their operations.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Hamermesh, supra note 118, at 1100.
See supra Part II.
See generally Hamermesh, supra note 118.
AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 31–32 (1981).
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.
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While corporations often agree to adhere to voluntary principles that
require them to take into account local conditions, 185 they nevertheless
continue to fail to report human rights violations, scrutinize aggressive
actions on behalf of security forces, and ensure adequate training of security
forces. 186 Therefore, the parameters of corporate conduct in weak
governance zones should be more strongly circumscribed within the
framework of corporate fiduciary duty, drawing from existing approaches to
fiduciary duty as well as existing soft law mechanisms. 187 In a recent
article, Cynthia Williams and John Conley point to the Delaware Chancery
Court’s decision in In re Caremark Derivative Litigation, noting that courts
have put “systems in place” to guard against certain risks. 188 Accordingly,
corporations could require systematic use of certain processes. The MOU is
an important starting point so long as corporations are held to a good faith
standard.
Additionally, the performance standards established by the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), which are required of corporations seeking IFC
investment funds, provide a useful framework for such a concrete
system. 189 These standards include impact assessments with human rights
elements and community consultation with compliance subject to review by
an ombudsman who may hear complaints from those adversely affected. 190
Using the IFC standards as a structure, corporations operating in weak
governance zones should be required to put in place a system that applies
impact assessments and community consultations. The purpose of such a
system is to gauge the impact of their operations on local communities and
to account for their needs so as to address first-tier property violations and
circumvent second-tier rights violations and their associated costs. Finally,
corporations should be held to certain monitoring requirements assessing
the ongoing rights implications of their operations and reporting on any
violations of such rights. The purpose of such reports would not simply be
to highlight human rights abuses, but to indicate to what extent the
corporation is accounting for local interests and maintaining its free market
responsibilities.

185. Corporations like Chevron Nigeria are often signatories of the Voluntary Principles for
Security and Human Rights, which provide human rights guideposts for companies in their
operations. AI NIGERIA REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
186. Id. at 8.
187. Soft law mechanisms refer to normative guidelines for operational standard setting and
accountability procedures—“global administrative rulemaking.” SRSG Report, supra note 3, at
16.
188. Williams, supra note 19, at 88.
189. SRSG Report, supra note 3, at 15.
190. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Irrespective of broader social responsibilities, the principles underlying
corporate governance implicate a certain type of political or legal regime
with at least minimal regulatory protections of individual freedom. The
absence of these underlying elements in unaccountable extractions calls into
question the legitimacy of corporate contracts in these regions. While recent
litigation under the ATCA is providing important opportunities for legal
redress in response to the most egregious human rights violations, existing
mechanisms fall short of reaching first-tier property violations. Thus, a
corresponding solution is necessary to address these violations and
reconcile shareholder primacy with free market principles. A cynical
response to such an approach may be that seeking a greater degree of
accountability in the contracting process would be prohibitively expensive
and is outside the role of the corporation. 191 However, by avoiding
responsibilities to local communities, corporations create additional
settlement costs, reputational costs, and risks in terms of the security and
stability of corporations’ natural resource operations. 192
Slowly, corporations are being forced to face their free market
responsibilities. In 2002, a group of female protestors demanding
employment opportunities and investment in local communities occupied
an oil terminal owned by Chevron Nigeria. 193 The occupation halted
production of an estimated 500,000 barrels of oil per day. 194 Exchanging
such costs with a broadly conceptualized fiduciary duty may serve as a
more legitimate alternative, which, far from invoking a new paradigm of
social responsibility, simply reinstates traditional free market principles.
While the practicalities of this approach are more complex than what has
been laid out here, particularly given the need for country-specific
approaches, the principle of consistency in adherence to free market norms
is a critical starting point.
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